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ABSTRACT
We uncover a new anomaly in asset pricing that is linked to the remuneration: the more
a company spends on salaries and benefits per employee, the better its stock performs, on
average. Moreover, the companies adopting similar remuneration policies share a common
risk, which is comparable to that of the value premium. For this purpose, we set up an
original methodology that uses firm financial characteristics to build factors that are less
correlated than in the standard asset pricing methodology. We quantify the importance of
these factors from an asset pricing perspective by introducing the factor correlation level as
a directly accessible proxy of eigenvalues of the correlation matrix. A rational explanation
of the remuneration anomaly involves the positive correlation between pay and employee
performance.
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I. Introduction
Should employers pay their employees better? Although this question might appear
provoking because lowering production costs remains a cornerstone of the contemporary
economy, we present the first attempt to report the real effects of employee remuneration
on asset pricing. Remuneration – defined as the annual salaries and benefits expenses (e.g.,
wages, bonuses, pension expenses, health insurance payment, etc.) per employee – is the basis
of any employment contract. For instance, pay was shown to explain, on average, 65% of the
variance in evaluations of overall job attractiveness (Rynes et al., 1983). Classical theory
states that profit-maximizing firms choose the level of labor pay by setting the marginal
cost of labor (i.e., the wage rate) equal to the marginal revenue product of labor (i.e., the
marginal benefit). Beyond this paradigm, we provide strong evidence that firms that pay
their employees better tend to over-perform on the stock market.
Our objective is to examine whether remuneration is an anomaly that can be priced in
asset pricing models. Schwert (2003) defines anomalies as “empirical results that seem to be
inconsistent with maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior (the CAPM). They indicate
either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or inadequacies in the asset-pricing model.
After they are documented and analyzed in the academic literature, anomalies often seem
to disappear, reverse, or attenuate.” Anomalies are typically identified either by regressing
a cross-section of average returns (e.g., the seminal Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach
uses the capitalization and book-to-market values), or by using a panel regression of the
cross-section of returns with different factor returns through the F-Statistic (Gibbons et al.,
1989), or by using a portfolio-based approach that segregates individual stocks with similar
capitalization and book-to-market values into different style portfolios (Fama and French,
1993). In the latter case (which we refer to as the “FF approach”), the factors formed on
small minus big market capitalization portfolios (SMB) and high minus low book-to-market
portfolios (HML) explain an important part of the identified anomalies (Fama and French,
1996). Over recent decades, the growing number of discovered anomalies suggests that
the standard asset pricing models fail to explain much of the cross-sectional variation in
average stock returns. Meanwhile, the effect of remuneration on company performance has
surprisingly never been tested, despite the fact that employers pay particular attention to
labor costs in attempting to maximize profits.
This research contributes empirically to the asset pricing literature by introducing an
observable firm characteristic, namely the remuneration, as a candidate anomaly. More
precisely, we focus on remuneration as a priced factor. Indeed, it remains unclear how
far remuneration can explain the cross-section of returns despite a sizeable literature on
2
labor economics that relates labor to asset pricing. This branch of literature has intensively
investigated the impact of labor decisions on the firm’s value, notably through the operating
leverage, which affects the equity returns riskiness. However, to our best knowledge, there
are no asset pricing studies that incorporate employee’s wages as a pricing factor. Besides,
based on the impressive list of anomalies analyzed by Harvey et al. (2015), we find only
one paper that highlights income as a potential factor. Indeed, Gomez et al. (2015) analyze
the relation between U.S. census division-level labor income and the cross-section of returns
using the standard Fama and French (1993) approach. More specifically, these authors use
per capita personal income (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) as a new candidate
factor and conclude that the cross-section of stock returns depends on the census district in
which the headquarters of the firm are located. Unfortunately, as Harvey et al. (2015) has
noted, “most of the division level labor income have a non-significant t-statistic. We do not
count their factors”. Moreover, we use remuneration at the company level to generate results
that are more realistic from an asset pricing perspective, which contrasts with Gomez et al.
(2015), whose scope is limited to income per state and per division.
This research contributes also theoretically to the asset pricing literature by introduc-
ing a new methodology to build factors that is conceptually close to principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) but goes beyond its noise-induced limitations. This methodology
presents many advantages compared with the conventional multi-factor approach developed
by Fama and French (1992, 1993). We propose a new measure of “explanatory power” of
factors where the relevance of the factor does not depend on the number of considered fac-
tors, in contrast to the R-squared argument of the FF setting. Hence, we introduce the
Factor Correlation Level (FCL) as a metrics of common risks that measures the ability of
stocks within the factor to fluctuate in a common way. Importantly, it allows ordering the
factors according to their capacity of taking into account the variability of stocks, and there-
fore to their importance from an asset pricing perspective. In this respect, our ranking by
the FCL indicator resembles principal component analysis. At the same time, this indica-
tor is also linked to the R-squared value of the factor in the asset pricing model: higher
FCLs correspond to higher R-squared values in the asset pricing model with one factor. The
empirical validation of the FCL methodology is founded on an exhaustive testing protocol.
First, we use ten factors that summarize most of the existing factors: dividend, capital-
ization, liquidity, momentum, low-volatility, debt-to-book, sales-to-market, book-to-market,
cash and, of course, the remuneration factor; those which are not present in this list remain
correlated with some of these factors; we check that performance associated with the remu-
neration factor is not explained by other major factors such as low-volatility, capitalization,
book-to-market, or momentum. Second, we consider six “supersectors” that are used to split
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stocks into comparable groups since remuneration varies strongly from one sector to another.
Third, we employ a large data set of 3612 daily single stock close prices from January 2001
to July 2015 for the 569 biggest companies in Europe. For comparison, we also treat the
same number of randomly selected companies in the U.S.A. whose capitalization exceeds 1
billion of dollars. Although we do not access the remuneration data for these companies,
the analysis of other factors allows us to validate the FCL methodology on the U.S. mar-
ket (often considered as a benchmark) and to compare our predictions to whose of the FF
approach. Fourth, we perform several robustness checks to examine if the results change
with the tested variations; for instance, we perform a separate analysis with the 258 biggest
companies from U.K. to check for potential domestic biases; we also run the methodology
on monthly data to check the role of time scale; in the spirit of comparability, we evaluate
the factor performances with seven incremental transitions from the standard FF approach
to our methodology. Finally, we compare our results with the basic PCA and illustrate its
limitations. Our main result indicates that a market neutral investment strategy based on
the remuneration anomaly would likely deliver positive annual returns of 2.42% above the
market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II offers a literature review
that covers several fields of research. Section III describes the novel methodology. Section
IV presents the data, whereas Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI discusses
the advantages and limitations of our methodology and compares it with the FF approach.
Section VII summarizes the main findings and concludes.
II. Literature review
A. The asset pricing
This article is mainly related to the asset pricing literature in which previous studies have
shown that the average returns of common stocks are related to firm characteristics such as
capitalization, price-earnings ratio, cash flow, book-to-market, past sales growth and past
returns. For example, stocks with lower market capitalization tend to have higher average
returns (Banz, 1981). Another important anomaly is the value premium: value stocks have
higher returns than growth stocks, which is likely because the market undervalues distressed
stocks (Fama and French, 1998). More precisely, small stocks and value stocks have higher
average returns than their betas can explain (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). Profitabil-
ity and investment also add to the description of average returns (Fama and French, 2015).
The low volatility anomaly was revealed for medium and big stocks in addition to growth
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stocks (Jordan and Riley, 2013). Those stocks that are expected to have high idiosyncratic
risk earn high returns in the cross-section (Fu, 2009). This result contradicts previous find-
ings made by Ang et al. (2006), who posit that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have
low average returns. Macroeconomic risk has also been connected with the cross-section of
returns. For instance, the growth rate of industrial production is seen as a priced risk factor
in standard asset pricing tests (Chen et al., 1986; Liu and Zhang, 2008). There is a size effect
in bank stock returns that differs from the market capitalization effects documented in non-
financial stock returns (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). The most popular anomaly is momentum:
stocks with low past returns tend to have low future returns while stocks with high past re-
turns tend to have high future returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Hence, the momentum
strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers should earn abnormal returns in upcom-
ing years. Return momentum has also been observed when spreads in average momentum
returns decrease from smaller to bigger stocks (Fama and French, 2012). However, momen-
tum strategies seem to produce losses specifically in January (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993),
probably based on taxation effects (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004). Similarly, changes in
book equity appear to be more informative about expected stock returns than price returns
(Bali et al., 2013). Notably, certain stock market anomalies may appear and then disappear
after publication in academic journals (McLean and Pontiff, 2015). In spite of the abundant
literature, the work by Gomez et al. (2015) seems to be the sole article that considers income
as a candidate anomaly although it is still not an income per employee but rather per state
and per division. Several models have been developed to provide economic interpretations of
numerous stylized anomalies and to improve the performance of the CAPM.1 Simultaneously,
the anomaly-based evidence against the CAPM has been questioned because anomalies have
primarily been confined to small stocks (Cederburg et al., 2015).2
1 Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) introduced a two-beta model to explain the capitalization and book-
to-market value anomalies in stock returns by splitting the CAPM into a cash-flow beta with a higher
price of risk than a discount-rate beta. Fama and French (1993) proposed a three-factor model to capture
the patterns in U.S. average returns associated with capitalization and value-versus-growth. Even after
a theoretical rationale for the three-factor model was provided by Ferguson and Shockley (2003), many
anomalies remain unexplained by the three-factor model (Fama and French, 2015). Although a four-factor
model has been derived (Carhart, 1997), it has also failed to absorb all the momentum in U.S. average stock
returns (Avramov and Chordia, 2006). Recently, a five-factor model was introduced to capture capitalization,
value, profitability, and investment patterns in average stock returns and is reputed to perform better than
the three-factor model (Fama and French, 2015).
2 In line with this criticism, doubt was cast on the set of anomalies to consider in a multi-factorial setup,
given that Harvey et al. (2015) have summarized 316 potential factors by reviewing 313 papers published
since 1967. In the same vein, 38 out of 80 potential firm-level anomalies were shown to be insignificant in
the broad cross-section of average stock returns (Hou et al., 2015). In addition, mistakes can easily be made
in this field due to multiple testing or data mining methods. As noted by Harvey and Liu (2015), many
discovered factors are likely to be false if their t-statistics do not exceed 3. Finally, these papers suggest that
many claims in the anomalies literature are likely to be exaggerated regarding the associated t-statistics.
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B. Corporate finance
This article is also related to the extensive literature on corporate finance, which has
also continued to investigate the relation between remuneration and performance, although
it has usually focused on managerial pay as opposed to the broader category of employ-
ees that we consider in the present study. This branch of literature typically examines the
wage as a managerial incentive likely to reduce agency costs by designing an optimal job
contract. In that sense, we may consider that solving the incentive problem leads to share-
holder value creation affecting stock returns. Indeed, managers face both discipline and
opportunities provided by the free market economy that leads to the notion that there is no
need for explicit contracts to resolve incentive problems (Fama, 1980). Nevertheless, market
forces cannot act as a complete substitute for contracts (Holmstrom, 1999) because career
concerns must be considered to design optimal contracts and to arrive at strong incentives
(Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). The effects of incentives depend on how they are designed
(Gneezy et al., 2011), given that managers have considerable power to shape their own pay
arrangements – and perhaps to even hurting shareholder interest (Bebchuk et al., 2002).
Indeed, public company disclosures do not provide a comprehensive measure of managerial
incentive to increase shareholder value (O’Byrne and Young, 2010). Many explanations were
brought forward to justify top managers’ remuneration. Firms with abundant investment
opportunities pay their executives better (Gaver and Gaver, 1995). The increase in the level
of stock-option compensation can be explained by the inability of boards to evaluate its
real costs (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Jensen et al., 2004). The capitalization of large firms
explains many patterns in top manager pay across firms, over time, and between countries
(Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Manager fixed effects, interpreted as unobserved managerial
attributes and understood as a proxy for latent managerial ability, are important in ex-
plaining the level of executive remuneration (Graham et al., 2012). Overall, remuneration
matters because it may affect a corporation’s level of risk as bonus-driven remuneration
might encourage excessive risk-taking. However, pay and risk are correlated not because
mis-aligned pay drives risk-taking, but rather because principal agent theory predicts that
riskier but more profitable firms must pay more remuneration than less risky firms to provide
a risk-averse manager the same incentives (Cheng et al., 2015).
C. Labor economics
The labor economics literature treats this question through the “efficiency wage theory”
by relating it to unemployment. Yellen (1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) did a remark-
able work with an analysis that is built – unlike most economic models – mainly on sociology
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and psychology with experimentation that delivers salient stylized facts on human behavior
in a working context. Efficiency wage theory maintains that rising wages is the best way
to increase output per employee because it links pecuniary incentives to employee perfor-
mance. In particular, the use of performance pay packages by employers has been shown
to increase employee productivity (Lazear, 2000) and job satisfaction (Green and Heywood,
2008). There are several interesting studies that relate labor market to asset pricing. All
these empirical results emphasize the significant impact of labor decisions, in which wage
plays a prominent role, onto firm’s value. Santos and Veronesi (2006) show that labor income
to consumption ratio is a strong predictor of long horizon returns. Danthine and Donaldson
(2002) explain that operating leverage is more significant for the riskiness of equity returns
than financial leverage. In other words, attention should be paid to wages, particularly be-
cause the priority nature of wages enhances the risk of dividends. In this spirit, Kuehn et al.
(2013) note that a high value of unemployment makes wages inelastic, which gives rise to
operating leverage. The impact of inelastic wages is even stronger in bad times as it amplifies
the equity risk premium. Gourio (2007) argues that because wages are smooth, revenues are
more cyclic than costs, making the profits more volatile. In particular, firms with high book-
to-market or with low productivity, i.e. value firms, have more pro-cyclic earnings. Ochoa
(2013) finds a positive and statistically significant relation between the reliance on skilled
labor and expected returns. In times of high volatility, firms with a high share of skilled
workers earn an annual return of 2.7% above those with a high share of unskilled workers no-
tably because their labor is more costly to adjust. Labor decisions made by workers can affect
firm risk (Donangelo, 2014) while hiring decisions can also be the determinants of firm risk
(Carlson et al., 2004; Belo et al., 2014). Indeed, Donangelo (2014) discusses the idea that
mobile workers carry some of the firm’s capital productivity when they leave an industry. He
finds that portfolios that hold long positions in stocks of high-mobility industries (general
workers) and short positions in stocks of low-mobility industries (industry-specific workers)
earn an annual return spread of over 5%. Like Monika and Yashiv (2007) who explain that
labor should matter since firms’ market value embodies the value of hiring, Belo et al. (2014)
argue that the market value of a firm reflects the value of its labor force because the firm can
extract rents as compensation for the costs associated with adjusting its labor force. They
find that long positions in stocks of low-hiring firms and short positions in high-hiring firms
earn an average annual excess stock return of 5.6%. Favilukis and Xiaoji (2016) introduce
infrequent renegotiation in standard wages model showing that it leads to smooth average
wages. Due to this wage rigidity, they find that wage growth forecasts long-horizon excess
equity returns.
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D. Social sciences
This article is also broadly related to several streams of research in various social sciences,
including sociology, psychology and human resources. In these fields, wage acts like a moti-
vator since it typically reflects a social preference for rewards likely to affect the employee’s
performance. Sociological studies have developed a theory of social exchange in which there
are equivalent rewards on both sides (Blau, 1955), which is consistent with the preference
for reciprocity that is viewed as a social preference, as it depends on the behavior of the
reference person (Fehr and Falk, 2002). Reciprocity induces agents to cooperate voluntarily
with the principal when the principal treats them correctly; the evidence for reciprocity is
based on a so-called gift exchange experiment.
Psychological studies highlight the exchange in working situations in which the perceived
value of labor equals the perceived value of remuneration, based on the theory of equity
(Adams, 1963). When there is no mismatch between effort and wages, employees may
change their perceived effort and even their perceived level of remuneration by redefining
the non-pecuniary component.
Human resources studies generally offer evidence that money is an important motivator
for most people (Rynes et al., 2004), as pay can help climbing on the Maslow’s motivational
hierarchy of needs, including social esteem and self-actualization. Nevertheless, tangible
rewards might also produce secondary negative effects on motivation (Baker, 1992) by fore-
stalling self-regulation (Deci et al., 1999).
III. Methodology
In this section, we introduce a new methodology to build factors that combines advantages
of the PCA and the Fama and French (1993) approach. As would be the case with the PCA,
our factors are built to be uncorrelated with the market index and with sectorial factors. For
each factor, we introduce and estimate the Factor Correlation Level (FCL) that
allows us to order the factors based on their importance and to select the most
important ones in asset pricing models.
A. Conventional diagonalization of the covariance and correlation matrices
Identifying common risks of multiple assets is necessary to diversify investments and can
help to profit from style’s arbitrage opportunities. Conventional approaches, such as PCA,
attempt to diagonalize the empirical covariance (or correlation) matrix of the traded uni-
verse, i.e., to decorrelate assets by constructing independent linear combinations (portfolios)
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of assets. Each eigenvector of the covariance matrix represents the coefficients of one such
combination while the corresponding eigenvalue gives its variance. If the covariance ma-
trix does not contain negative elements (i.e., if there are no negatively correlated assets),
the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue has positive elements that can be
interpreted as relative weights of stocks in the market mode. The classical long portfolio,
following the market, can be constructed by investing in proportion to these weights. In
turn, market neutral portfolios should be orthogonal to the market mode and therefore have
both long and short positions (the latter corresponding to negative weights). The other
eigenvectors capture different common risks of the traded universe, and the most common
include sectorial risks (e.g., banking sector, commodities, energy, etc.).
In mathematical terms, if the covariance matrix Ω of stocks was known precisely, it might
be diagonalized to identify uncorrelated linear combinations of stocks and their variances
to assess the related risks. For a traded universe with n stocks, let r1, . . . , rn denote the
daily returns of these stocks at a given time. The covariance matrix has n eigenvalues
λ1, . . . , λn and n eigenvectors V1, . . . , Vn satisfying ΩVα = λαVα (for each α = 1, . . . , n).
Each eigenvector Vα determines one linear combination of stocks, (Vα)1r1 + . . . + (Vα)nrn,
which is decorrelated from the others, while the eigenvalue λα is its variance (under the
condition that Vα is appropriately normalized).
The above eigenbasis can be interpreted as follows. For any linear combination of stocks
with weights wi, rpi = w1r1 + . . .+wnrn = (w · r) (written as a scalar product), the variance
of such a portfolio pi can be expressed as
〈rpi2〉 = 〈
(
n∑
i=1
wiri
)2
〉 =
n∑
i,j=1
wiwjΩi,j =
n∑
i,j=1
wiwj
n∑
α=1
λα(Vα)i(Vα)j =
n∑
α=1
λα(w · Vα)2, (1)
where 〈. . .〉 denotes the expectation, and the returns rk were assumed to be centered. In
other words, the variance is decomposed into a sum of variances λα of independent linear
combinations proportional to the projection of the weights wi onto the corresponding eigen-
vector Vα. If the weights wi are chosen in proportion to the elements of one eigenvector, i.e.,
wi = c(Vα)i for some α and c, then the orthogonality of Vα to other eigenvectors yields
〈rpi2〉 = λαc2(Vα · Vα)2 = λα (w · w), (2)
where we used the L2-normalization of the eigenvectors: (Vα · Vα) = 1. As expected, the
variance of such a linear combination is fully determined by the corresponding eigenvalue
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λα. Notably, the above relation can also be written as
λα =
〈rpi2〉∑n
i=1w
2
i
(3)
to estimate the variance of the linear combination whose weights are constructed close to an
eigenvector.
As different stocks exhibit quite distinct volatilities, it is convenient to rescale the stock’s
return ri by its realized volatility σi: r˜i = ri/σi. This rescaling is also known to re-
duce heterogeneity of volatilities among stocks and heteroskedasticity (Andersen et al., 2000;
Bouchaud et al., 2001; Valeyre et al., 2013). In other words, one can write
〈rpi2〉 = 〈
(
n∑
i=1
wiσir˜i
)2
〉 =
n∑
i,j=1
w˜iw˜jCi,j, (4)
where w˜i = wiσi and C = 〈r˜ir˜j〉 is the covariance matrix of the renormalized returns r˜i
or, equivalently, the correlation matrix of returns ri: Ωi,j = σiσjCi,j. To proceed, the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Ω can be replaced by the eigenvalues λ˜α and eigenvectors V˜α
of the correlation matrix C, CV˜α = λ˜αV˜α, i.e.,
〈rpi2〉 =
n∑
i,j=1
w˜iw˜j
n∑
α=1
λ˜α(V˜α)i(V˜α)j =
n∑
α=1
λ˜α(w˜ · V˜α)2. (5)
If the volatility-normalized weights w˜i are chosen to be proportional to the elements of an
eigenvector, w˜i = c(V˜α)i, one obtains 〈rpi2〉 = λ˜αc2(V˜α · V˜α) = λ˜αc2 = λ˜α(w˜, w˜), from which
λ˜α =
〈rpi2〉∑n
i=1w
2
i σ
2
i
, (6)
where the L2-normalization of V˜α was used: (V˜α · V˜α) = 1. As previously discussed, λ˜α is
the rescaled variance of the linear combination of the volatility-normalized returns r˜i (given
by the eigenvector V˜α), each of which is decorrelated from other such combinations. By
construction, the variance λ˜α is normalized, which facilitates the comparison of different
factors and different markets. We emphasize that diagonalizations of the covariance and
correlation matrices are generally not equivalent; in particular, the eigenvalues λα, λ˜α and the
eigenvectors Vα, V˜α are different (though in our case, their interpretations should be close).
We choose the second option (i.e., Eq. (6)), which inherently reduces stock heterogeneity
and heteroskedasticity due to rescaling.
Unfortunately, a straightforward diagonalization of the empirical covariance or correlation
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matrix estimated from stock price series is known to be very sensitive to noise (Laloux et al.,
1999; Plerou et al., 1999, 2002; Potters et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011; Allez and Bouchaud,
2012). In particular, only a few eigenvectors corresponding to the largest eigenvalues can be
estimated, as illustrated and further discussed in Sec. V.D. As a consequence, conventional
diagonalization does not appear suitable for building various representative factors.
B. Our methodology: Indicator-based factors
We propose a different approach to building factors. We begin from the available eco-
nomic and financial indicators regarding the traded companies, such as their capitalization,
sales-to-market, dividend yields, etc. We expect that companies with comparable indica-
tors – at least those with comparable indicators in the extreme quantiles of the indicator
distribution – will exhibit correlations in their stock performance. This hypothesis allows
us to construct and then test indicator-based factors beyond sectors. To minimize sectorial
correlations, we split the stocks into six supersectors of similar sizes, as detailed in Appendix
A. The following construction is performed separately for each supersector and then the data
are aggregated (see below).
We consider ten indicator-based factors:
1. The dividend factor, which is based on the dividend yield.
2. The capitalization (or size) factor, which is based on capitalization.
3. The liquidity factor, which is based on the ratio of the weekly exponential moving
average to the total number of shares (i.e., capitalization/close price).
4. The momentum factor, which is based on the 3-year exponential moving average of
past daily returns.
5. The low-volatility (or beta) factor, which is based on the sensitivity to the stock index.
6. The leverage factor, which is based on the debt-to-book value ratio.
7. The sales-to-market factor, which is based on the ratio of sales to market value at the
end of the fiscal period.
8. The book-to-market factor, which is based on the ratio of the book value to the market
value at the end of the fiscal period.
9. The remuneration factor, which is based on salaries and benefits expense per employee.
10. The cash factor, which is based on the ratio between the free cash flow and the latest
market value.
We believe that considering these 10 factors is sufficient and including additional factors
will not significantly change our results. In particular we might have included the investment
and profitability factors following Fama and French (2015), but we expect that our 10 factors
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already capture the common risk from these two factors. Indeed, sales and cash should
be correlated with profitability, whereas the dividend yield and leverage ratio should be
correlated with investment.
For each trading day, the stocks of the chosen supersector are sorted according to the
indicator (e.g., remuneration) available the day before (we use the publication date and not
the valuation date). The related indicator-based factor is formed by buying the first qns
stocks in the sorted list and shorting the last qns stocks, where ns is the number of stocks in
the considered supersector, and 0 < q < 1
2
is a chosen quantile level. The other stocks (with
intermediate indicator values) are not included (weighted by 0). In the simplest setting, one
can choose equal weights:
wi =


+1, if i belongs to the first qns stocks in the sorted list,
−1, if i belongs to the last qns stocks in the sorted list,
0, otherwise.
(7)
In attempting to reduce the specific risk, the common practice suggests to invest inversely
proportional to the stock’s volatility σi, i.e., to set wi = ±1/σi or 0. Moreover, the inverse
stock volatility should also be bounded to reduce the impact of extreme specific risk. Each
trading day, we recompute the weight wi as follows
wi =


+µ+min{1, σmean/σi}, if i belongs to the first qns stocks in the sorted list,
−µ−min{1, σmean/σi}, if i belongs to the last qns stocks in the sorted list,
0, otherwise,
(8)
where σmean =
1
ns
(σ1 + . . . + σns) is the mean estimated volatility over the supersector. In
this manner, the weights of low-volatility stocks are reduced to avoid strongly unbalanced
portfolios concentrated in such stocks. The two common multipliers, µ±, are used to ensure
the beta market neutral condition:
ns∑
i=1
βiwi = 0, (9)
where βi is the sensitivity of stock i to the market (obtained by a linear regression of the
normalized stock and index returns based on the reactive volatility model (Valeyre et al.,
2013); note that the use of standard daily returns leads to similar results, see Appendix
B). If the aggregated sensitivity of the long part of the portfolio to the market is higher
than that of the short part of the portfolio, its weight is reduced by the common multiplier
µ+ <
1
2qns
, which is obtained from Eq. (9) by setting µ− =
1
2qns
(which implies that the
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sum of absolute weights |wi| does not exceed 1). In the opposite situation (when the short
part of the portfolio has a higher aggregated beta), one sets µ+ =
1
2qns
and determines the
reducing multiplier µ− <
1
2qns
from Eq. (9). This method of ensuring the market neutral
condition is better than leaving the residual beta (as in the FF approach) or withdrawing it
by subtracting an appropriate constant from all weights. Indeed, under our approach, the
factor is maintained to be invested only in stocks that are sensitive to this factor. In turn,
subtracting a constant would affect all stocks, even those that were “excluded” and whose
weights were set to 0 in Eq. (8). We also emphasize the difference with the conventional FF
approach: our factors are built to be market-neutral under Eq. (9), whereas the
FF portfolio is built to be delta-neutral (i.e., to have zero net investment):
ns∑
i=1
wi = 0. (10)
The resulting factor is obtained by aggregating the weights constructed for each super-
sector. This construction is repeated for each of the ten factors listed above. We emphasize
that the factors are constructed on a daily basis, i.e., the weights are re-evaluated daily
based on updated indicators. However, most indicators do not change frequently so that the
transaction costs related to changing the factors are not significant.
The above procedure can be extended to construct factors from other quantiles, in ad-
dition to the first and the last. In this manner, we will consider three portfolios for each
factor:
• Q1: long positions for stocks whose indicator belongs to the first 15% quantile and
short positions for stocks in the last 15% quantile, as discussed above (for q = 0.15).
• Q2: long positions for stocks in the second 15% quantile and short positions for stocks
in the next-to-last 15% quantile (i.e., positive weights are assigned to stocks ranging
between 0.15ns and 0.30ns in the list, and negative weights are assigned to stocks
ranging between 0.70ns and 0.85ns).
• Q3: long positions for stocks in the third 15% quantile (0.30ns − 0.45ns) and short
positions for stocks in the third-to-last 15% quantile (0.55ns − 0.70ns).
To evaluate common risk with each factor, we introduce the factor correlation level (FCL)
as the square root of the ratio between the empirical variance of the indicator-based factor
and the total empirical variance of the constituent stocks:
FCL(t) =
(
EMA {rpi2(t)}
EMA {∑ni=1w2i (t)σ2i (t)}
)1/2
, (11)
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where rpi(t) is the daily return of the factor,
rpi(t) =
n∑
i=1
wi(t)ri(t), (12)
where wi(t) is the weight of the stock i in the factor, and σi(t) is the volatility of the stock i
estimated using the reactive volatility model (Valeyre et al., 2013). The exponential moving
average (EMA) is used with a long averaging period of 200 days to reduce noise by smoothing
measurements. We emphasize that the above sum aggregates stocks from all supersectors.
We also considered the standard volatility estimator based on a 40-days exponential moving
average and obtained similar results (see Appendix B). The square root in Eq. (11) is taken
to operate with volatilities instead of variances. The estimator (11) is built analogously
to Eq. (6) for the eigenvalues λ˜α of the correlation matrix. This analogy relies on the
assumption that the indicator-based weights wi are close to an eigenvector of the correlation
matrix. Since the true correlation matrix is unavailable, it is impossible to directly validate
this strong assumption. We will therefore resort to indirect validations based on empirical
correlations of the constructed factors and on the profitability of trading strategies derived
from such factors. Note also that the weights wi depend on the choice of the quantile q, such
that we expect to have slightly different results for different quantiles (see Fig. 4 below).
Simultaneously, the analogy to eigenvalues of the correlation matrix allows various factors to
be classified according to their “importance”: larger values of FCL mean stronger volatility
of the factor and therefore higher common risks. For example, when the correlation of small
capitalization firms increases while the volatility of individuals stocks remains stable, the
FCL of the capitalization factor will increase, and the volatility of the factor will increase.
In general, the risk of a factor is proportional to the average individual volatility multiplied by
the FCL. For this reason, FCL can be interpreted as an average correlation measure
between stocks within the factor that is also directly linked to the common risk
level underpinning the factor. It must also be emphasized that the FCL estimator is
dynamic, i.e., it can capture changes in the correlation structure of the market over time.
IV. Data
In this study, we use only liquid stocks (most with capitalization greater than 800 million
euros), thus excluding microcap firms that are typically the main focus of the labor stud-
ies we have cited. Thanks to the European accounting regulations, the remuneration must
be provided by European companies on a regular basis and can thus be accessed through
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Capitalization Number of employees Remuneration
Europe (13± 25) Be (41± 78) thousand (0.13± 0.99) Me
U.K. (11± 21) B£ (38± 87) thousand (0.08± 0.08) M£
Table I Basic statistics (mean and standard deviation) regarding capitalization (in billions
of euro/pounds), number of employees (in thousands), and remuneration (in millions of
euro/pounds) from the FACTSET database. Since minimal capitalization is approximately
800 million euros, the distribution is truncated at small capitalizations.
commercial databases such as FACTSET. Lacking such information for the U.S. market, we
mainly focus on the European companies. To reveal possible nation-specific features, the
analysis is performed for two trading universes: (i) the 569 biggest companies in Europe
(London Stock Exchange, Euronext, Eurex, Sixt), and (ii) the 258 biggest companies on the
London Stock Exchange only. Although the twice-as-large European universe is expected
to increase the statistical significance of the results, the consideration of the U.K.-bounded
universe allows us to eliminate country biases and additional fluctuations (e.g., due to cur-
rency exchange rate variations). We will show that the major conclusions are similar for
both universes. In addition, we will validate our indicator-based methodology on the U.S.
universe that includes the 569 randomly selected companies whose capitalization is above 1
billions of dollar. Note that the universe of the 1229 biggest firms in the U.S. studied by
Fama and French (2008) is comparable to our European universe in terms of capitalization
and liquidity.
All the companies that we include in the European and U.K. universes belong to the
small (below 1 billion euros), mid (between 1 and 5 billion euros), large (between 5 and 20
billion euros), or big (above 20 billion euros) capitalization categories. The data set consists
of 3612 daily single stock close prices from January 2001 to July 2015. Note that most
Fama and French data begin from 1963, which leads to greater t-statistics. We rely
on daily prices (instead of the monthly prices that are commonly used in the literature) to
have more precision in the temporal granularity of our FCL estimation. In addition, several
economic and financial indicators are extracted from the FACTSET database: book-to-
market, capitalization, sales-to-market, dividend yield, debt-to-book, free cash flow, salaries
and benefit expenses, and the number of employees on an annual basis (see Table I). For the
European universe, we partly offset geographical biases in each indicator by renormalizing it
to its median in the country. For instance, remuneration is divided by its median by country,
whereas the median by country is subtracted from the moving average of returns in the case
of momentum.
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V. Empirical results
In this section, we present the main results of our methodology applied to the European,
the U.K. and the U.S. universes. We mainly focus on the remuneration indicator, which has
largely been ignored so far. We will show that remuneration yields a non-negligible common
risk and represents a small anomaly. The possibility of revealing the role of the remuneration
factor relies on the proposed FCL methodology.
A. Correlation between remuneration and capitalization
First, we inspect the empirical joint distribution of remuneration and capitalization. This
inspection is important because a positive size-wage effect has already been well documented
in the economic literature for microcapitalization firms (Lallemand et al., 2007). The wage
gap due to firm size is approximately 35% (Oi and Idson, 1999) because large firms (but
remaining in the microcapitalization category) demand a higher quality of labor and set a
higher performance standard that must be supported by a compensating wage difference.
Note that the magnitude and determinants of the employer-size wage premium vary across in-
dustrialized countries. Indeed, individual effects explain approximately 90% of inter-industry
and firm-size wage differences in France (Abowd et al., 1999), while almost 50% of the firm-
size wage differentials in Switzerland derive from a firm-size effect (Winter-Ebmer et al.,
1999). In the U.K., larger firms pay better because of internal labor markets that reward
effort and firm-specific capital (Belfield et al., 2004). A visual inspection of Figure 1 (top)
suggests that there is almost no correlation between remuneration and capitalization within
the class of liquid stocks (that excludes microcapitalization firms) and, in any case, residual
correlation is not significant. As a consequence, a larger firm from our sample does not
necessarily pay its employees more. This result is consistent with the literature.
To confirm that the remuneration anomaly exists for different capitalizations, we split
our sample in two groups: the above-median group of stocks whose capitalization exceeds
the median size of our sample, and the below-median group with the remaining stocks
(we recall that both groups exclude microcapitalization firms). For each group, we build
its own remuneration factor. Figure 2 shows that the cumulative performances of both
remuneration factors are statistically different from 0 and behave similarly. An apparent
slight outperformance of the factor constructed for the below-median group is not significant
and can be attributed to statistical fluctuations.
Further investigations on the size-wage effect compel us to explore this relation per em-
ployee. Figure 1 (bottom) reveals that remuneration is positively correlated to cap-
italization per employee, i.e., remuneration increases with the amount of capitalization
16
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Figure 1. Remuneration versus capitalization (top) and remuneration versus capitalization
per employee (bottom). Full circles and empty diamonds present large U.K. and European
companies, respectively. Both quantities are shown in local currency and plotted on a loga-
rithmic scale to account for significant dispersion in capitalization and remuneration. Solid
and dashed lines indicate the linear regression between the logarithms of these quantities for
the U.K. and European universes, respectively (the respective slopes are 0.34 and 0.30, and
R2 goodness of fit are 0.48 and 0.58, respectively). Since the records on remuneration and
capitalization of each company in the FACTSET database are updated at different moments
of the year, data were averaged over the period from 15/12/2014 to 30/07/2015. Similar re-
sults were obtained by taking the latest record for each company (not shown). Two subplots
show the empirical distributions of capitalization (top) and remuneration (right) among the
biggest European companies. 17
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Figure 2. Similar cumulative performance anomalies of two remuneration factors for quan-
tile Q1: one is constructed from stocks whose capitalization exceeds the median size of our
sample, and the other is constructed from the remaining stocks. The cumulative performance
of both factors after 15 years is approximately 9%, yielding an annualized performance of
0.6% (compared with 0.68% in Table IV). These curves are obtained for the European uni-
verse (the results for the U.K. universe are similar and thus not shown). The annualized
performance for the remuneration factor is thus biased and cannot be fully explained by an
unbiased random walk.
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per employee. One plausible explanation for this phenomenon might be that reducing the
number of employees (in particular, underperforming employees) increases marginal remu-
neration. In summary, there is no correlation between capitalization and remuneration for
both universes of firms with capitalization over 800 million euros. Simultaneously, remuner-
ation increases with the amount of capitalization per employee – as if the cake had to be
shared fewer times.
B. Remuneration as a common risk
The motivation for building indicator-based factors relies on the hypothesis that the
stocks with close indicator values behave similarly and thus share common risks. To verify
this hypothesis, we compare three realizations of the remuneration factor built on different
quantiles (Q1, Q2, and Q3), as described in Section III.B. Figure 3 shows weak but highly
significant correlation between the daily returns of the remuneration factors from quantiles
Q1 and Q2 (top) and Q1 and Q3 (bottom), notwithstanding that these factors have no
stocks in common, which is the indirect proof that the companies adopting similar
remuneration policies (e.g., paying their employees well) share a common risk.
The weak correlation can be explained by a rapid decrease of the stock sensitivity to the
remuneration factor with the quantile: the correlation level of (Q1,Q3) is measured to be half
that of (Q1,Q2). The common risk is of the same order of magnitude as the residual risk,
even for Q1. In summary, only the stocks in the extreme quantiles are the most sensitive
to the remuneration factor. This observation is also confirmed by the anomalies that are
more important for extreme quantiles, as shown in Figure 4.
C. Factor correlation level as a proxy of the eigenvalues
Ordering the factors based on their importance is central for the asset pricing analysis.
As discussed in Sec. III.B, the relevance of indicator-based factors can be characterized
using the factor correlation level (FCL) defined by Eq. (11). If the factor weights were
approximately proportional to the elements of an eigenvector of the correlation matrix, the
FCL would be an estimator of the volatility of this factor. The factors with larger FCL
would most likely have greater impact on the portfolio returns for the same exposure. In
general, the risk of a factor is proportional to the average individual volatility multiplied by
the FCL. Thus, FCL can be interpreted as an average correlation measurement
between stocks within the factor.
Using the daily returns of each factor and estimating the realized volatility of each stock,
we compute the FCL for each factor based on Eq. (11). Figure 5 shows the time evolution
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Figure 3. (Top) Correlation between the daily returns of the two remuneration factors
constructed on quantiles Q1 (0%–15% and 85%–100%) and Q2 (15%–30% and 70%–85%),
which have no stocks in common. The daily returns of these factors are weakly correlated but
correlation is significant: the slope and its 95%-confidence interval is 0.19±0.03. (Bottom)
For comparison, the correlation between the daily returns of the remuneration factors Q1
and Q3 (30%–45% and 55%–70%) is shown, with the slope and its 95%-confidence interval
0.10 ± 0.03. Both graphs were obtained for the European universe. Similar graphs for the
U.K. universe yield the slopes 0.23±0.03 and 0.02±0.03 for Q1-Q2 and Q1-Q3 correlations,
respectively (graphs are not shown but are available upon request).
20
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
−10%
−5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
year
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
 
Q1
Q2
Q3
Figure 4. The cumulative performance of the remuneration factor for the three quantiles
(Q1, Q2 and Q3) for the European universe (the graph for the U.K. universe is similar and
is available upon request). Biases are more pronounced for Q1 than for Q2 or Q3, which
might be explained by the possibility that stocks belonging to the extreme quantile are the
most sensitive to the remuneration anomaly.
of the FCLs for ten indicator-based factors defined in Sec. III.B. For comparison, we plot
the FCLs for the European and the U.S. universes (the FCLs for the U.K. universe behave
similarly and are thus not shown). First, the FCLs exhibit strong variations over time. In
particular, the FCLs of two factors can cross each other, i.e., the ordering of the factors
based on their “importance” can evolve over time. For both universes, the low-volatility
factor appears as the most important, followed by capitalization and momentum factors.
Other factors are smaller but statistically significant. Averaging the FCL over 15 years al-
lows us to order the factors according to their importance. Table II suggests the following
order for the European universe: low-volatility (1.73), capitalization (1.72), mo-
mentum (1.41), sales-to-market (1.22), liquidity (1.19), book-to-market (1.13),
dividend (1.09), leverage (1.07), remuneration (0.99), and cash (0.92). All these
FCLs are higher than the noise level of 0.78 that we estimated by building a “noise factor”
according to an arbitrary non-financial indicator, such as an alphabetic order. Even though
the remuneration factor is relatively small, its magnitude remains statistically relevant in
comparison with other well-known factors. For example, the FCLs of the book-to-market,
dividend, leverage and cash factors are close to that of the remuneration factor. Their low
values mean that these factors are not particularly volatile and that the related common
risks are low. Conversely, the low-volatility factor (excluded from the FF approach) has the
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FCL Div. Cap. Liq. Mom. Low Lev. Sales Book Rem. Cash Market
Europe 1.09 1.72 1.19 1.41 1.73 1.07 1.22 1.13 0.99 0.92 10.41
U.K. 0.97 1.45 0.92 1.15 1.38 0.96 1.03 0.96 0.93 0.83 6.73
U.S. 1.49 1.73 1.49 1.62 2.10 1.15 1.41 1.12 − 0.95 12.35
Table II The mean value of the FCL for ten factors (quantile Q1) averaged over the period
from 10/08/2001 to 31/07/2015, for the European, U.K., and U.S. universes. According to
these values, the main factors for asset pricing are the low-volatility factor (excluded from
the FF approach), followed by the capitalization, and momentum factors. We see that the
book-to-market and remuneration factors are of the same order of magnitude such that the
remuneration factor should have the same importance in asset pricing models as the book-
to-market factor. We also estimated the FCL of the market (last column). The FCL of a
noise factor was estimated to be around 0.8 for three universes implying that all presented
factors exceed noise. Note that we could not construct the remuneration factor for the U.S.
universe because of lack of systematic remuneration data for U.S. companies.
highest FCL and is thus identified as the first potential source of risk in a portfolio, after
market index and sectorial risks. Notably, the low-volatility factor is comparable to the
capitalization factor and greatly exceeds the book-to-market factor, the two “major” factors
identified in the Fama and French (1993) model.
D. Comparison with the principal component analysis
The principal component analysis (PCA), which is applied to decorrelate time series,
consists in forming the empirical correlation matrix from daily stock returns and then finding
its eigenvalues and eigenvectors. In practice, the number of stocks in a traded universe
(typically 500 - 1000) is often comparable to the number of available historic returns per
stock (for instance, 3612 daily returns in our dataset), that makes this general method
strongly sensible to noise, as discussed in (Laloux et al., 1999; Plerou et al., 1999, 2002;
Potters et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011; Allez and Bouchaud, 2012).
In order to illustrate this limitation, we apply the PCA to the European universe and
compute numerically 569 eigenvalues. Figure 6 shows the histogram of square roots of the
obtained eigenvalues, i.e., how many eigenvalues are contained in successive bins of size
0.0626. The largest value, λ
1/2
market ≈ 12.62, corresponding to the market mode, was excluded
from the plot for a better visualization of other values. One can identify approximately
ten well-separated single eigenvalues that are typically attributed to market sectors. In
turn, the remaining part of (smaller) eigenvalues lying close to each other and thus almost
indistinguishable, can be rationalized by using the random matrix theory (Laloux et al.,
1999). If the daily stock returns were distributed as independent Gaussian variables (with
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Figure 5. Evolution of the factor correlation level (FCL) for ten factors (quantile Q1): the
European (top) and USA (bottom) universes (the behavior for the U.K. universe is similar
and available upon request). In our interpretation, FCL is a measure of “importance” of
factors in asset pricing models. Thick lines highlight the three major factors: low-volatility,
capitalization, and momentum. The mean FCLs averaged over 14 years are summarized
in Table II. All FCLs are highly volatile, but this volatility is not linked to stock market
volatility. In addition, we can see the jump- and cross-over of FCLs. During the 2007–2008
financial crisis, several FCLs collapse for the U.S. universe. Note that we could not construct
the remuneration factor for the U.S. universe because of lack of systematic remuneration data
for U.S. companies.
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mean zero and variance one), the eigenvalues of the underlying empirical correlation matrix
would asymptotically be distributed according to the Marcenko-Pastur density
ρ(λ) =
√
4qλ− (λ+ q − 1)2
2piqλ
, (13)
where q = N/T is the ratio between the number of stocks, N , and the number of daily
returns per stock, T . These eigenvalues lie between two critical values, λmin = (1−√q)2 and
λmax = (1+
√
q)2. As a consequence, the eigenvalues obtained by diagonalizing the empirical
correlation matrix and lying below λmax can be understood as statistical uncertainty of the
PCA. In other words, the PCA cannot reliably identify the factors with λ < λmax. For our
European universe, q = 569/3612 so that
√
λmax ≈ 1.4 determines a theoretical threshold
between larger, significant eigenvalues, and smaller, noisy ones.
Comparing large values in Fig. 6 to the FCL from Table II, we conclude that PCA
might identify three major factors: low-volatility (1.73), capitalization (1.72), and momen-
tum (1.41). In turn, the other factors whose the FCL is smaller than the PCA threshold
1.4, would thus be understood as statistical uncertainty in the PCA method. The crucial
advantage of our method, in which factors are built from firm-based indicators
while market and sectorial correlations are eliminated by construction, is the
possibility to go beyond this PCA limit and to identify the factors with smaller
FCLs. Moreover, this identification can be performed over time.
E. Net investment as a proxy of the exposure to the low-volatility factor
Building market-neutral portfolios requires nonzero net investment when the portfolio
is exposed to the low volatility anomaly. This anomaly is governed by the low-volatility
factor, which is the most influential factor (after market and sectors) according to our FCL
measurement (Table II), and unfortunately a residual exposure to the low-volatility factor
cannot be easily reduced. As a result, most factors can still be correlated to the low-volatility
factor. Thus, when the average beta of long stocks in a factor is significantly different from
the average beta of short stocks, the factor is also exposed to the low-volatility factor with
a nonzero net investment. The net investment is defined as the difference between long
(ωi > 0) and short (ωi < 0) investments normalized by total investment, i.e.,
∆ =
∑n
i=1wi∑n
i=1 |wi|
. (14)
By construction, ∆ can vary between −1 and 1 or, equivalently, between −100% and 100%.
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Figure 6. Histogram of square roots of eigenvalues, λ1/2, of the empirical correlation
matrix obtained from daily returns of 569 stocks in the Europe universe over the period
from 10/08/2001 to 31/07/2015. The largest value, λ
1/2
market ≈ 12.62, corresponding to the
market mode, was excluded from the plot for a better visualization of other values.
Replacing the individual sensitivities βi in the market neutral relation (9) by the averages
〈βL〉 and 〈βS〉 for long and short stocks, the net investment ∆ from Eq. (14) can also be
expressed as
∆ =
〈βS〉 − 〈βL〉
〈βS〉+ 〈βL〉 . (15)
When the average sensitivities for long and short stocks are similar, net investment is close
to 0. In turn, a net bias in ∆ occurs when the average beta is different for long and short
stocks. ∆ is a proxy of the exposure to the low-volatility factor that is more reactive and
more precise than the estimation obtained through the usual regression of returns.
The bias in the long and short betas in Eq. (15) may also be related to the sensitivity
to the market (i.e., to the stock index) of a factor built with the FF approach (i.e., neutral
in nominal but not in beta):
βFF = 〈βL〉 − 〈βS〉 = −2〈β〉∆, (16)
where 〈β〉 = 1
2
(〈βS〉+〈βL〉) is the average beta of the universe that we estimated as 〈β〉 ≈ 0.65
for the period from 2001 to 2015. The net investment ∆ can also be related to the sensitivity
of any beta neutral portfolio or factor (both in the FF approach and in our methodology)
to the low-volatility factor (the most influential factor, according to the FCL).
Figure 7 shows that the low-volatility factor has the most important short investment
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Figure 7. Evolution of the net investment ∆ for five indicator-based factors for the Euro-
pean universe: capitalization, momentum, low-volatility, book-to-market, and remuneration
(the results for the U.K. universe are not shown but are available upon request). We recall
that ∆ is a proxy of the exposure to the low-volatility factor. The remuneration ∆ is around
zero, and the factor therefore has no correlation with the low-volatility factor. Other factors
seem to be more exposed to the low-volatility factor.
(negative values of ∆ ranging between −80% and −60%), although its sensitivity to the
market was maintained at 0. Other factors also have a bias in ∆, including the capitalization
and the momentum factors, in particular. In the FF approach, these factors would therefore
also have a significant sensitivity to the market. In particular, the low-volatility factor built
with the FF approach would be strongly correlated to the market. Moreover, ∆ indicates
that most factors have a residual correlation with the low-volatility factor that remains
uncorrected by our method. Since 2003, the ∆ of the book-to-market factor (one of the
major anomalies investigated by Fama and French) has shrunk, and the related book-
to-market anomaly has almost disappeared (see Table IV). Finally, the remuneration
factor shows nearly zero net investment, i.e., it remains uncorrelated with the low-volatility
factor.
F. Other inter-factor correlations
Correlations between factors matter as long as one needs uncorrelated portfolios for asset
pricing purposes. The indicator-based factors were introduced to build as many uncorrelated
portfolios as possible. At the same time, such an explicit construction does not guarantee
to yield truly uncorrelated combinations, such as the eigenvectors of the covariance (or
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correlation) matrix. Moreover, some indicators may capture the same economic or financial
features of the company and may thus be correlated; in other words, different factors may
approximate the same eigenvector and thus be highly correlated. In particular, adding new
indicator-based factors does not necessarily help to capture new features and may thus be
redundant. The choice of the ten indicator-based factors studied in this paper is judged
as sufficient with respect to the trade-off between capturing information and remaining
uncorrelated. Table III presents the correlation coefficients between ten indicator-based
factors estimated from their volatility-normalized daily returns. Clearly, many indicator-
based factors remain correlated. If the same estimation was applied to ten independent
Gaussian vectors of the same length (m = 3612 elements), the standard deviation of the
estimated correlation coefficients would be 1/
√
m ≈ 0.0166. In other words, the presented
correlations between the indicator-based factors are highly significant.
The remuneration factor exhibits correlations with some other factors, and the most
significant of these include the following: the sales-to-market (−0.38), dividend (−0.23),
and momentum (0.20) factors. These correlations can be explained as follows. First, the
companies with low sales-to-market ratios have a high margin and thus the abil-
ity to pay their employees well (strong negative correlation −0.38). The direct link
between a firm’s margin and wage is well documented in the labor economics literature.
More precisely, there is a relation between margin and labor cost. For instance, a study by
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) reveals that larger firms make more extensive use of margin for la-
bor cost-cutting strategies, i.e., firms choose to reduce benefits as a cost-cutting strategy
(Babecky et al., 2012). In addition, the positive relation between firm size and the use of
cost-cutting strategies that is monotonically increasing and highly significant, is uncovered.
Second, the companies that pay high dividends to shareholders tend to remu-
nerate their employees less, yielding a negative correlation of −0.23, which is a direct
representation of profit-sharing within firms. Indeed, dividend payments are charged on the
profits of the business after all salaries and benefits expenses are paid out. Although this
result appears intuitive, it remains important as it reveals the level of correlation between
both quantities. The labor economics literature and the corporate finance literature are not
very well documented on this particular issue. Finally, companies that perform well
and show strong momentum can offer higher remuneration to their employees
or, alternatively, the higher remuneration stimulates employees to work better
and to imbue the company with momentum (positive correlation 0.20). This is a
central and very important result of our research because it highlights the positive relation
between pay and performance. The rationale behind this result is discussed in Section VI.
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Div. Cap. Liq. Mom. Low Lev. Sales. Book. Rem. Cash
Div. 0.10 0.14 -0.33 0.02 0.29 0.26 0.18 -0.23 0.14
Cap. 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.21 -0.20 -0.06 0.05 -0.01
Liq. 0.14 0.08 -0.21 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.05
Mom. -0.33 0.10 -0.21 -0.18 -0.24 -0.25 -0.36 0.20 -0.04
Low 0.02 0.13 0.20 -0.18 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.05
Lev. 0.29 0.21 0.09 -0.24 0.02 0.23 0.11 -0.17 -0.02
Sales. 0.26 -0.20 0.05 -0.25 0.01 0.23 0.31 -0.38 0.23
Book. 0.18 -0.06 0.05 -0.36 0.07 0.11 0.31 -0.13 0.05
Rem. -0.23 0.05 -0.06 0.20 -0.03 -0.17 -0.38 -0.13 -0.11
Cash 0.14 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.23 0.05 -0.11
Table III Correlation coefficients between 10 indicator-based factors for the U.K. companies:
Dividend (1), capitalization (2), liquidity (3), momentum (4), low-volatility (5), leverage
(6), sales-to-market (7), book-to-market (8), remuneration (9), and cash (10). These coef-
ficients were estimated from daily returns of these factors over the period from 23/02/2001
to 27/07/2015. Daily returns of each factor were normalized by their volatility averaged
over 20 days to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity. Similar correlation coefficients were
obtained for the European companies (available upon request).
It is worth emphasizing that these correlations between factors are not static (as pre-
sented in Table III by averaging over 15 years) but evolve over time. For example, Fig.
8 shows the evolution of two correlation coefficients between volatility-normalized daily re-
turns of remuneration, low-volatility, and sales-to-market factors. The correlation between
the remuneration and low-volatility factors remains close to zero, with eventual deviations
beyond the Gaussian significance range (e.g., during the subprime and financial crises in
2007-2009). These two factors can be considered uncorrelated. In turn, the negative cor-
relation between the remuneration and sales-to-market factors always remains beyond the
Gaussian significance range.
G. The anomaly of the remuneration factor and its interpretation
Table IV compares the remuneration anomaly with other factors in terms of the annual-
ized bias (the annualized cumulative return between the last and the first observation days),
the Sharpe ratio (the annualized bias normalized by annualized volatility), and t-statistics
(the Sharpe ratio multiplied by the square root of the total duration in years). In particular,
the t-statistic allows one to reject the null hypothesis of no bias at the 90% confidence level.
The bias reveals the level of overperformance due to a particular factor. We observe a
significant bias for the dominant capitalization and low-volatility factors, which have been
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Figure 8. Correlation coefficients between daily returns of the remuneration factor and of
the low-volatility factor (solid line) or the sales-to-market factor (dashed line) for the largest
U.K. companies. The coefficients were computed over a sliding window of 90 days. Prior to
computation, the daily returns were renormalized by their average volatility over the previous
20 days. The mean values over 15 years are −0.03 and −0.38 (see Table III), respectively.
Horizontal dashed lines show the standard deviation, 0.105, of the same estimator applied to
two independent Gaussian samples. Similar results were obtained for the European universe
(available upon request).
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previously documented. The anomaly of the book-to-market factor seems to have disap-
peared (see Table IV). In fact, the Sharpe ratio that we estimated to be 0.49 for the period
from 1926 to 2008 in the U.S.3, became much smaller in recent years (and even changed
the sign for the European universe, becoming −0.08). We suspect that this result can be
explained by the change in its exposition to the low-volatility factor. The momentum factor
has also changed direction.
The remuneration factor appears as the sixth most important anomaly in the U.K. mar-
ket, and the eighth most important anomaly in the European market. A bias of 1.21%
means that companies that pay better should overperform their less paying com-
petitors by 2× 1.21%. The prefactor 2 appears if we assume that 50% is invested in high
remuneration and 50% in low remuneration (i.e., there is no exposure to the low-volatility
factor and volatility is nearly homogeneously distributed). This is one of the most impor-
tant results in this paper, as it shows that a market neutral investment style arbitrage
strategy based on the remuneration anomaly is likely to deliver positive returns.
Next, assuming that the bias in the remuneration factor consists of an intrinsic bias and
contributions from biases of other factors due to inter-factor correlations, the relative im-
pacts of these biases can be estimated by multiplying them by the correlation coefficients
in the 9th line of Table III. These relative impacts are summarized in the last line of Table
IV. Since most contributions from other factors are negative, it might be surmised that the
intrinsic remuneration bias is even higher than 1.21% (estimated to be around 2.85%) but
that its value is reduced due to correlations with other factors. If we were able to build a re-
muneration factor fully decorrelated from other factors, we would have obtained most likely
a t-statistic above 3 (around 3.29, see Table IV) that fulfills the requirements formulated
by Harvey et al. (2015). Note also that there is no selection bias in our study (we have not
analyzed all the different possibilities to finally retain the remuneration factor), such that
the condition requiring a t-statistic greater than 3 when taking into account the number
of possible anomaly candidates is not applicable. In any event, the observed bias of 1.21%
cannot simply be explained by the biases of other factors. The Sharpe ratio of 0.37 indicates
that a horizon of 1/0.37 ≈ 2.7 years is required for the anomaly to be captured and to have
a positive return with a likelihood of 84%. From an asset management point of view, it
suggests the recommended time horizon to take profits based on this market anomaly.
3Based on the publicly available data from Fama and French,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Div. Cap. Liq. Mom. Low Lev. Sales. Book. Rem. Cash
E
u
ro
p
e Bias, % 2.39 -5.72 -0.95 -1.60 -4.15 -1.95 0.08 -0.23 0.68 1.66
Sharpe 0.80 -1.69 -0.41 -0.42 -1.46 -0.74 0.03 -0.08 0.25 0.65
t-stat 3.04 -6.42 -1.57 -1.59 -5.57 -2.81 0.11 -0.30 0.97 2.46
U
.K
. Bias, % 2.12 -4.29 -0.11 -2.81 -3.81 -1.01 0.92 0.34 1.21 2.60
Sharpe 0.65 -1.38 -0.05 -0.71 -1.25 -0.35 0.31 0.11 0.37 0.92
t-stat 2.48 -5.24 -0.18 -2.71 -4.77 -1.34 1.16 0.40 1.40 3.51
Impact, % -0.49 -0.21 0.01 -0.56 0.11 0.17 -0.35 -0.04 1.21 -0.29
Table IV The annualized bias (the annualized cumulative return between the last and the
first observation days, as a percentage), the Sharpe ratio (annualized bias normalized by
annualized volatility), and the t-statistic (the Sharpe ratio multiplied by the square root of
the total duration in years, i.e., by
√
14.5 ≃ 3.81) for the following 10 indicator-based factors
(quantile Q1): dividend (1), capitalization (2), liquidity (3), momentum (4), low-volatility
(5), leverage (6), sales-to-market (7), book-to-market (8), remuneration (9), and cash (10).
These quantities are estimated for the period from January 2001 to July 2015, for the largest
European companies (top lines) and for the largest U.K. companies (bottom lines). The last
line shows the relative impacts of the biases of various factors on the remuneration bias
(1.21) for the U.K. companies. These impacts are obtained by multiplying the biases in
the fourth line by the correlation coefficients from the 9th line of Table III. The annualized
bias for the remuneration factor in the U.K. universe is 1.21% with a t-statistic of 1.21.
Moreover, if we subtract all the impacts from remuneration’s annualized bias, we obtain an
intrinsic remuneration bias of 2.85%. Therefore, we would have a t-statistic of approximately
2.85×1.40/1.21 = 3.29 that would fulfill the requirements formulated by Harvey et al. (2015).
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H. The rationale behind the remuneration anomaly
In a survey paper, Yellen (1984) poses the question of why firms do not cut wages in an
economy characterized by involuntary unemployment? Indeed, unemployed workers would
prefer to work at the real wage rather than being unemployed, but firms will not hire them at
a lower wage simply because any reduction in wage would lower employee productivity. This
is Yellen’s most-cited paper, and it stipulates that the amount of effort that employees put
into their job depends on the difference between the wage they are getting paid and what they
perceive as a “fair wage”. The bigger the difference, the less hard they tend to work, which
highlights the idea that paying employees more than the market clearing wage may boost
productivity and ends up being worthwhile for the employer. Paradoxically, cutting wages
may end up raising labor costs since it will negatively affect productivity (Stiglitz, 1981).
Hence, productivity is the main argument, which is confirmed by other theoretical papers
that consider employees to be more productive in larger firms and thus explain why they
demand higher wages (Idson and Oi, 1999). The other arguments are as follows. Given job
contract incompleteness, not all duties of an employee can be specified in advance. For this
reason, monitoring is a central instrument to control production costs (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972). Unfortunately, monitoring is too costly and sometimes inaccurate due to measurement
error. Instead of having costly and imperfect monitoring, firms can offer higher wages to their
employees to create an incentive for the employee not to lose their high wage by being fired
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). In this context, paying a wage in excess of the market clearing
wage can be seen as an efficient way to prevent employees from shirking. The attractiveness
of wages to skillful workers also contributes to reduce their turnover. Moreover, raising wages
partly eliminates job demands from less performing candidates who would fear competing
with overperforming candidates. This adverse selection is a subtle support for the fair wage
hypothesis because paying fair wages will attract only the more skillful workers and deter
lemons and will thus help avoid costly monitoring devices in the recruitment processes. In
summary, the motivation for the fair wage-effort hypothesis is a simple observation of human
nature arguing that employees who receive less than what they perceive to be a fair wage
will not work as hard as a consequence. In the very same vein, Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
set up a model of unemployment in which “people work less hard if they are paid less than
they deserve, but not harder if they receive more than they deserve”. The model puts in
equation the fair wage-effort hypothesis to represent the idea that a poorly paid employee
may be keen on taking its revenge on its employer.
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VI. Discussion
A. Fama and French approach
Fama and French (1993, 2015) use time series of 25 portfolios, each portfolio built with
similar capitalization and book-to-market stocks. They regress the monthly performance
Ri(t) of each portfolio i on the returns fj(t) of different factors j:
Ri(t) = ai +
∑
j
bi,jfj(t) + εi(t),
where ai and εi(t) are portfolio-specific intercept and noise, and bi,j is the estimated sensi-
tivity of the i-th portfolio to the j-th factor.
If the remuneration factor had to be investigated using the FF approach, how could one
proceed? Five different portfolios might be built with stocks sorted according to remunera-
tion and then at least three major factors might be used: the market index, capitalization,
and book-to-market factors (the factor returns, fj(t), would be estimated through the per-
formance of the long-short portfolio, e.g., buying the high capitalization and shorting the
low capitalization, or buying the high book-to-market and shorting the low book-to-market).
The intercept, ai, for the 5 different portfolios might be measured with their t-statistics to
assess whether the remuneration is an anomaly. One might also measure the ahigh−alow and
its t-statistics, as in Table 2 by Fama and French (2008). Finally, the remuneration factor
might be added to the regression panel and the R2 for every portfolio might be measured to
quantify how well the data fit the statistical model and how well the common factors explain
the price returns.
Instead, we simply measure the average returns of the HML portfolio (see Table IV)
built to be beta-neutral without any regression, as we construct our remuneration factor
as uncorrelated to the main factors. That should be close to the 1
2
(ahigh − alow) of the FF
approach, or close to the average return of the HML portfolio built to be delta-neutral (see
Table I from Fama and French (2015)). This is due to the fact that the remuneration factor
is not exposed to the market index, low-volatility and book-to-market factors. However, the
FF approach would not account for the fact that remuneration depends on sectors (see Table
V). Using the volatility of the portfolio, we can also measure the t-statistics to learn whether
the anomaly is statistically significant, and we measure the FCL to quantify how well the
common factors explain the price returns.
In Appendix B we compare the FF approach to our methodology. In particular, we
show that sectorial constraint and beta-neutral property were the two key advantages of
our factors construction: without them, the FF approach applied to the same period,
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Sectors Median book-to-market Median remuneration (in euros)
Consumer discretionary 0.31443 22 859.96
Consumer staple 0.24681 39 416.51
Energy 0.81440 137 625.91
Financial 0.87972 126 498.10
Health 0.24442 51 452.06
Industrial 0.32765 58 626.27
IT 0.19867 77 854.94
Material 0.55733 32 516.14
Telecom 0.39122 66 283.21
Utilities 0.32572 47 014.69
Table V Sectorial variations of the median of the book-to-market and of the remuneration
(in euros) for the U.K. universe in 2014. Both book-to-market value and remuneration vary
substantially across different sectors.
would give insignificant results for the remuneration factor (we recall that most
Fama and French data begin from 1963, which leads to greater t-statistics).
B. Advantages and limitations of the methodology
Our methodology has several advantages over the FF approach:
1. The estimated FCL quantifying the relevance of the factor does not depend on the
number of considered factors, in contrast to the R2 argument of the FF approach (e.g.,
see Table 6 in Fama and French (1993)). Thus, one can select the most important fac-
tors (e.g., stock index, low-volatility, capitalization, liquidity, and momentum factors)
in asset pricing models.
2. The sensitivities of the different common risk factors to the market (i.e., to the stock
index) are maintained at zero even for the low-volatility factor, which is an important
feature because the market mode may have a hundred times greater impact on portfolio
returns than other factors.
3. The factors are constructed to be sector neutral, which allows one to better identify
their impacts on price variations, which is important because intra-sector correlations
are typically more important than within-factor correlations. Notably, the book-to-
market factor of FF approach also captures sectorial risk, as the firms are not priced in
the same way from one sector to another (see Table V). In particular, the remuneration
is very different from one sector to another.
4. Weights (wi) of the stocks that are close in capitalization (or in book-to-market, or in
remuneration, etc., depending on the factor) are of the same order of magnitude that
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reduces the specific risk of the factor.
5. Maintaining factors beta-neutral at any time reduces the noise of factors, even those
that are not supposed to be correlated to the stock index. In fact, we will show in
Appendix B that in the case of factors uncorrelated to the stock index, the beta-neutral
constraint reduces the volatility of the factor by 1.2% on an annualized basis.
6. Our method enables the inclusion of the low-volatility factor into the cross-section of
average returns (in contrast to the FF approach) without any multiregression model.
The low-volatility and capitalization factors were found to provide the largest anomaly
(see Table IV). In addition, the low-volatility factor was also identified as the major
contribution to risk, according to our measurement (see Fig. 5). Surprisingly, the
capitalization factor, which had previously been considered as the most important,
now occupies the second position. Moreover, the book-to-market factor identified by
Fama and French (1993) as important, has eventually become a minor factor (and is
just slightly more important than the remuneration factor) after having eliminated the
sectoral and market modes.
The main limitations to our methodology are related to the methodology itself. Indeed,
although introducing indicator-based factors and their relevance assessments through the
FCL were inspired by eigenbasis, this construction does not pretend to yield true eigenvectors
and eigenvalues of the covariance (or correlation) matrix. In particular, correlations observed
between several factors (e.g., the remuneration and sales-to-market factors) indicate that the
decorrelation performed is not perfect. Although the construction of factors can be further
refined to make them less correlated (e.g., by splitting the stocks into smaller groups than
supersectors), it is difficult to quantitatively assess the quality of such improvements.
VII. Conclusion
We identify a new anomaly in asset pricing that is statistically significant and econom-
ically relevant. It is linked to remuneration: the more a company pays for salaries and
benefits expenses per employee, the better its stock performs. We show that remuneration is
a common risk factor although its magnitude appears relatively small compared with domi-
nant factors such as low-volatility or capitalization. It also appears that only the companies
that belong to extreme quantiles are sensitive to the remuneration factor. To validate the
abnormal performance associated with the remuneration factor, we check that performance
is not explained by other major factors such as low-volatility, capitalization, book-to-market,
or momentum. This finding is an empirical contribution to the asset pricing because em-
ployee’s remuneration has not been accounted for in so far, while it is a determinant element
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in social sciences including labor economics, sociology or management. These various strands
of literature show that strong attention should be paid to wages and more generally to labor
decisions that are likely to affect firms’ value. The economic interpretation of our key finding
is mainly based on a rational explanation of the remuneration anomaly: wages and employee
performance are positively correlated. This argument is overall supported by the efficiency
wage theory, which claims that rising wages is the best way to increase output per employee
because it links pecuniary incentives to employee performance. But it is also supported by
several studies highlighting the prominent role of operating leverage as a main source of
riskiness of equity returns that is comparable in magnitude to financial leverage.
For this purpose, we introduce an original methodology, coined “Factor Correlation Level”
(FCL), to build indicator-based factors. The FCL describes the ability of stocks within the
factor to move in a common way and thus reflects the common risk level underpinning each
factor. The FCL methodology is a theoretical contribution to the asset pricing literature.
Indeed, it allows ordering the factors according to their capacity of taking into account the
variability of stocks. This ranking can help fund managers to select the most important
factors to set up an asset pricing model and well balanced portfolios. The FCL approach is
an alternative to the common practice in asset pricing studies where factor selection depends
on several statistical criteria that do not necessarily convey the same information.
Implications of this work are important, numerous and go far beyond asset pricing lit-
erature. A first investment style implication of our finding is that the companies that pay
better should overperform their competitors by 2.42% per year. In other words, a market
neutral investment style arbitrage strategy based on the remuneration anomaly would likely
deliver positive returns. A second economics implication is that a company might operate
better if it could attract the best human resources while maintaining the company as com-
petitive as possible by keeping only those employees who are productive. While we find
that a company that pays too much its shareholders, pays less to its employees according
to the negative correlation between remuneration and dividend factors, attention should be
brought by top managers to this trade-off between equity capital and labor remuneration.
A third research implication is that our new methodology suggests the following ranking for
the European stocks according to their respective FCLs: low-volatility (1.73), capitalization
(1.72), momentum (1.41), sales-to-market (1.22), liquidity (1.19), book-to-market (1.13),
dividend (1.09), leverage (1.07), remuneration (0.99), and cash (0.92). In particular, the
low-volatility factor, which is excluded from the FF approach, is the next most important
component following the market factor (i.e., the stock index). The remuneration factor is
comparable to the book-to-market factor and thus not negligible. We conclude that a five
factor model should encapsulate the first five anomalies ordered by their FCL.
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1 Food & Staples Retailing
Food, Beverage & Tobacco
Health Care Equipment & Services
Household & Personal Products
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences
2 Banks
Diversified Financials
Insurance
3 Consumer Durables & Apparel
Consumer Services
Media
Retailing
4 Materials
Real Estate
5 Energy
Transportation
Utilities
6 Automobiles & Components
Capital Goods
Commercial & Professional Services
Software & Services
Technology Hardware & Equipment
Telecommunication Services
Table VI Six supersectors that we used to split stocks and to construct the indicator-based
factors (from the FACTSET database). Note that we mixed very different industries to have
6 supersectors with approximately the same number of stocks. Even if different industries
were grouped randomly into six supersectors, we show in Appendix B that our methodolody
would reduce significantly the sectorial risk of different factors.
Appendix A. Supersectors
Following the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), we constructed six super-
sectors as summarized in Table VI. This redistribution has been performed manually and
has aimed at minimizing intrasector correlations and at obtaining an almost equal number
of stocks in each supersector. We emphasize that final portfolios include the stocks from all
supersectors, i.e., this redistribution is only an intermediate technical step to improve the
factors.
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Appendix B. Comparison with FF approach
In order to highlight the advantages of our methodology as compared to the standard FF
approach, it is instructive to consider incremental transformations from one method to the
other. In this way, one can analyze the respective roles of several proposed improvements.
For this purpose, we implement the standard FF approach and its progressive modifications.
• A0 (the standard FF approach): According to Table I from Fama and French (2015),
stocks are subdivided two groups of small (below median) and large (above median)
capitalization. Within each of two groups, assets are ordered according to the chosen
indicator (e.g., remuneration) and then split into three subgroups (top, medium and
bottom 33%). The related portfolio is constructed by buying the top 33% and selling
the bottom 33% assets from the sorted list with equal weights. Such prepared two
portfolios (for small and large capitalization groups) are then merged into a single
FF portfolio. To be comparable with our methodology, the portfolio is rebalanced on
daily basis (note that the original FF approach stipulated monthly rebalancing). The
constucted portfolio is delta-neutral.
• A1: The same rules as A0 except for buying top 15% and selling bottom 15% assets
(as in our methodology);
• A2: The same rules as A1 except that the splitting into small and large capitalization
groups is withdrown;
• A3: The same rules as A2 except that we add sectorial and geographical constraints as
in our methodology. In other words, assets are split into 6 supersectors (see Appendix
A), the portfolio construction is performed individually for each supersector and then
the obtained portfolios are merged. In addition, we normalize the chosen indicator
(e.g., remuneration) by the median per country to correct for geographical biases;
• A4: The same rules as A3 except that equal weights are replaced by volatility-based
weights as in our methodology;
• A5: The same rules as A4 except that the volatility-based weights are rescaled by fac-
tors µ± to get beta-neutral portfolios (beta’s are estimated throuh a standard method-
ology);
• A6 (our methodology): The same rules as A5 except that a standard volatility and beta
estimations (by exponential moving averages) are replaced by the reactive volatility
model.
Each of these seven approaches (A0, ..., A6) has been applied to both U.K. and European
universes. We computed the mean return and volatility of ten factor-based portfolios intro-
duced in this paper. To be closer to the standard Fama and French framework, we present
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Div. Cap. Low Mom. Liq. Lev. Sales. Book. Rem. Cash.
A
0
Mean 0.35% -0.93% 0.30% -0.64% 0.68% 0.02% -0.46% -0.33% -0.03% 0.35%
Std 3.20% 0.56% 4.90% 5.72% 3.92% 2.87% 3.16% 3.16% 2.04% 1.99%
t-stat 1.46 -22.40 0.83 -1.49 2.32 0.10 -1.97 -1.40 -0.18 2.37
A
1
Mean 0.37% -0.92% 0.34% -0.79% 0.75% 0.07% -0.53% -0.42% -0.02% 0.32%
Std 3.15% 0.44% 4.81% 5.52% 3.77% 2.80% 2.98% 3.04% 1.98% 1.97%
t-stat 1.58 -27.98 0.95 -1.91 2.66 0.32 -2.40 -1.87 -0.12 2.17
A
2
Mean 0.37% -1.12% -0.21% -0.49% 0.31% -0.23% -0.49% -0.27% -0.07% 0.38%
Std 3.41% 1.39% 4.80% 6.01% 3.85% 2.54% 3.18% 3.47% 2.00% 1.96%
t-stat 1.45 -10.82 -0.59 -1.09 1.07 -1.20 -2.09 -1.05 -0.44 2.62
A
3
Mean 0.41% -0.96% -0.19% -0.61% 0.31% -0.21% -0.40% -0.39% 0.00% 0.39%
Std 2.65% 1.17% 3.85% 4.99% 3.35% 2.31% 3.05% 2.60% 1.91% 1.69%
t-stat 2.06 -10.97 -0.68 -1.63 1.22 -1.23 -1.77 -2.03 0.02 3.11
A
4
Mean 0.41% -0.96% -0.19% -0.60% 0.30% -0.21% -0.41% -0.40% 0.00% 0.40%
Std 2.65% 1.17% 3.85% 4.98% 3.34% 2.31% 3.05% 2.59% 1.91% 1.68%
t-stat 2.06 -10.97 -0.68 -1.62 1.22 -1.19 -1.79 -2.06 0.03 3.17
A
5
Mean 0.41% -1.16% -0.86% -0.11% -0.34% -0.46% 0.02% -0.08% 0.22% 0.25%
Std 2.09% 1.97% 1.90% 3.34% 2.37% 1.58% 1.95% 1.94% 1.53% 1.61%
t-stat 2.61 -7.88 -6.04 -0.43 -1.94 -3.94 0.13 -0.58 1.92 2.06
A
6
Mean 0.45% -1.17% -0.82% -0.16% -0.36% -0.40% -0.03% -0.10% 0.19% 0.24%
Std 2.05% 1.91% 1.94% 3.33% 2.44% 1.59% 2.06% 2.00% 1.50% 1.60%
t-stat 2.94 -8.19 -5.63 -0.66 -2.00 -3.36 -0.22 -0.66 1.73 1.98
Table VII Progressive evaluation of factor performances with incremental transition from
the FF approach (A0, top) to our methodology (A6, bottom). For each factor, we present
mean monthly return (Mean) and volatility (Std), as well as their ratio (t-stat).
results on monthly basis, in contrast to the main text, in which daily basis was used. Table
VII recapitulates the main findings for the European universe (similar results were obtained
for the U.K. universe, available upon request).
As expected, the change of quantiles (passage from the standard A0 approach to A1)
almost does not affect the results. Similarly, a standard volatility/beta estimator and the
reactive volatility/beta model lead to similar results (passage from A5 to A6). The most
significant changes are observed when passing from A2 to A3 and from A4 to A5.
• In the former case, adding the sectorial constraints (see Appendix A) reduces secto-
rial biases and allows one to better capture the indicator-based factors. To illustrate this
point, let us suppose that remuneration is very high in the energy industry and is low (at
approximately the same level) in all other industries. If there was no sectorial constraint, the
remuneration factor would be long on the energy industry and short in all other industries.
In other words, it would be 100% invested in energy, with eventual high risks. In turn, the
sectorial constraint reduces this risk by approximately 1/6 because the strong concentration
on energy only remains in the 5th supersector while investments in other industries are nec-
essarily imposed for other supersectors. For instance, if the annualized sectorial volatility is
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12%, such an enforced diversification would reduce it to 2% on an annualized basis.
• In the latter case, we switch from the delta-neutral to beta-neutral portfolios, i.e., we
(partly) remove correlations with the stock market index. We evoque two possible origins
to rationalize the significant decrease of volatility when passing from A4 to A5. First, if
we suppose that stock beta’s follow a distribution with standard deviation sβ, the average
aggregated beta of a random delta-neutral factor built with 2×15%×500 = 150 stocks would
be 0, while its standard deviation would be 2sβ/
√
150 ≈ 16%sβ ≈ 6%, where we estimated
sβ ≈ 0.37 from our data. As a consequence, the volatility added by the random exposure to
the market index is around 6%× σm ≈ 1.2% on an annualized basis, where σm ≈ 21% is the
annualized volatility of the market index. Second, our construction of beta-neutral portfolio
reduces their leverage to ensure Eq. (9). Consequently, smaller investments lead to smaller
volatility, as compared to the Fama and French construction with a constant investment.
One also observes that volatilities of factors progressively diminish when passing from
A0 to A6. This observation indicates that our modifications better withdraw other common
risks and manage to concentrate on the risk of interest.
Looking more specifically to the remuneration factor, one can observe a significant in-
crease of t-stat, from −0.18 (insignificant) to 1.73 (significant), when passing from the stan-
dard FF approach (A0) to our methodology (A6). In other words, implementing the
above improvements allowed us to level up the remuneration factor from noise
to a small but significant anomaly.
We complete this Appendix by the following general remark. The variability of results
presented in Table VII indicates their dependence on a chosen data analysis method and its
parameters. The methodology plays therefore the crucial role, especially when dealing with
small anomalies such as remuneration. This highlights the advantage of our method that
enabled to detect and quantify such small features in the market behavior. At the same
time, our methodology remains robust against some changes in construction of factors, such
as replacing conventional volatility estimator by reactive volatility model, using volatility
renormalized weights, or changing daily to monthly returns.
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